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Abstract—The growing use of information and communication
technologies (ICT) in power grid operational environments has
been essential for operators to improve the monitoring, mainte-
nance and control of power generation, transmission and distri-
bution, however, at the expense of an increased grid exposure
to cyber threats. This paper considers cyberattack scenarios
targeting substation protective relays that can form the most
critical ingredient for the protection of power systems against
abnormal conditions. Disrupting the relays operations may yield
major consequences on the overall power grid performance
possibly leading to widespread blackouts. We investigate methods
for the enhancement of substation cybersecurity by leveraging the
potential of machine learning for the detection of transformer
differential protective relays anomalous behavior. The proposed
method analyses operational technology (OT) data obtained
from the substation current transformers (CTs) in order to
detect cyberattacks. Power systems simulation using OPAL-RT
HYPERSIM is used to generate training data sets, to simulate
the cyberattacks and to assess the cybersecurity enhancement
capability of the proposed machine learning algorithms.
Index Terms—Cyberphysical systems, operational technology,
machine learning, differential protective relays, transformers.
I. INTRODUCTION
RAPID deployment of standard and interoperable ICT inpower systems has raised serious cybersecurity concerns
in regulatory agencies and power utilities over the past decade
[1]. This is mainly because the security-by-obscurity philoso-
phy used as a defensive strategy for proprietary ICT in power
systems has become obsolete in the emerging standard and
interoperable ICT paradigm of smart grids [2].
In order to address the growing cybersecurity concerns, the
North American Electric Reliability Corporation has estab-
lished and enforced Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP)
standards. The CIP standards demand utilities to identify,
categorize and protect cyber assets that are essential to the
reliable operation of the bulk electric system [3]. Nevertheless,
CIP standards do not provide any guideline about the cyber-
secuity measures/tools that should be developed to improve
the cyber-resiliency of the assets. As such, different standards
and initiatives have been launched by National Standard Insti-
tutes like ISA [4]–[6], research institutes like Electric Power
Research Institute (EPRI) [7] and government agencies like
Department of Energy (DOE) [8], [9] to develop cybersecurity
measures/tools for cyber assets in power systems.
The digitalization of power grids over the past decade
has increased the cyberattack surfaces across several grid
components and promoted the cybersecurity enhancement of
its assets like substation protective relays to a top priority for
regulatory agencies and utilities, in particular following the
successful cyberattacks against Ukrainian power infrastruc-
tures [10], [11]. In a substation, protective relays form the most
critical defensive ingredient of power system against abnormal
conditions [12], [13]. Thus, their maloperations initiated by
cyberattacks may cause major consequences for power systems
such as widespread blackouts.
Cybersecurity of protective relays has been analyzed in the
literature from different perspectives. In [14], the impact of
cyberattacks against protective relays has been examined from
operational point of view. An analytical reliability assessment
framework has been proposed in [15] for quantifying the
impacts of cyberattacks against intelligent electronic devices
(IEDs) and protection systems. The impact of cyber-physical
attacks against communication-assisted protection schemes
has been studied in [16]. A rule-based intrusion detection
system has been presented in [17] for IEC 61850 protocol.
Cyber-resilient designs have been proposed in [18] and [19]
respectively for distance protection and line differential pro-
tection relays. Various anomaly detection systems (ADS) have
been presented in [20], [21] for substations. A collaborative
intrusion detection system (IDS) has been presented in [22]
for generic object oriented substation event (GOOSE) and
sampled value (SV) packets in IEC 61850 protocol. A machine
learning based method has been used in [24] to identify
cyberattacks against phasor measurement units (PMUs).
In this paper, a fully connected autoencoder is employed for
detection and mitigation of cyberattacks against transformer
differential protective relays. The fully connected autoencoder
is trained with three-phase current measurements from current
transformers (CTs) at both sides of a transformer. The fully
connected autoencoder is then used to detect anomalies in
three-phase currents. The simulation results demonstrate the
capability of fully connected autoencoder to detect cyberat-
tacks against transformer differential protective relays.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows.
• A method is presented for cybersecurity enhancement of
transformer differential protective relays using machine
learning.

















Fig. 1. Transformer differential protective relay.
method is investigated for two different cyberattack sce-
narios.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents the basics of transformer differential protective
relays and the potential cyberattack scenarios. The proposed
machine learning method for cybersecurity enhancement of
transformer differential protective relays is presented in Sec-
tion III. Section IV provides the test system, training data sets
and simulation results. The conclusions of the paper are given
in Section V.
II. TRANSFORMER DIFFERENTIAL PROTECTIVE RELAYS
AND CYBERATTACK SCENARIOS
A. Transformer Differential Protective Relays
The primary objective of transformer protective relays is to
detect internal transformer faults with high sensitivity and iso-
late the transformer as quickly as possible. Fast detection and
de-energization of transformer faults minimizes the damages to
the transformer as well as the need for subsequent repairs [12].
This task is normally performed by the transformer differential
protection.
The differential relaying is a powerful relaying principle
that can be used for any asset like transformers, lines, buses,
and so forth. The differential protective relays are designed to
measure the geometrical difference between electrical quanti-
ties in particular current measurements and operate when the
difference goes beyond a certain threshold.
B. Cyberattack Scenarios
We consider a substation automation scheme that employs
the IEC 61850 protocols GOOSE and SV for communication
between protective relays and merging units. The analog mea-
surements generated by the current transformers CT1 and CT2
in Fig. 1 are respectively converted by merging units MU1
and MU2 to SV packets. The GOOSE commands generated
by the differential protective relay in Fig. 1 are conveyed to
the merging units MU1 and MU2 in order to trigger actions
respectively on the circuit breakers CB1 and CB2.
We consider two cyberattack scenarios against the trans-
former differential protective relay. In the first scenario (re-





Fig. 2. Autoencoder structure
a compromised electronic component inside the merging unit
MU1, thus, corresponding to a supply chain attack such as in
[25]. The embedded malicious electronic component is able to
tamper the data received from CT1, for example, by changing
the magnitude of current measurements.
In the second scenario (referred to as Scenario 2), an
attacker gains remote access to the substation process bus
through the use of stolen legitimate operator credentials and a
remote connection to the substation communication network.
The attacker then performs false data injection attack by
injecting falsified SV packets on the process bus forcing the
differential protective relay to misoperate.
In both scenarios, falsified current measurements trigger the
differential protective relay and de-energize the transformer
in the absence of physical faults. Although substation and
control center operators observe the transformer tripping,
they would not be able to re-energize the transformer before
performing a comprehensive investigation about the reason
behind transformer tripping based on utility guidelines. Having
machine learning algorithms for anomaly detection would
provide a mitigation strategy to prevent differential protective
relay misoperation caused by cyberattacks.
III. PROPOSED MACHINE LEARNING METHOD
In this paper, we leverage a fully connected autoencoder for
cybersecurity enhancement of differential protective relays by
using it to detect anomalies.
From a technical perspective, a fully connected autoencoder
consists of two parts: an encoder and a decoder as illustrated in
Fig. 2. An encoder consists of an input layer, a variable number
of hidden layers and a code (embedding) layer. The code layer
connects the encoder and decoder. The decoder consists of the
same number of hidden layers as the encoder and an output
layer. An autoencoder is trained with inputs as output target
labels. When provided with a new input post-training, it will
nonlinearly embed the input into a code and then nonlinearly
decompress this code to approximately reconstruct the input
at the output [26].
In this work, we train the autoencoder on current mea-
surements that are free of cyberattacks with the aim that
it will be able to accurately compress and reconstruct such
attack-free measurements. It is noteworthy that the attack-free
measurements are easy to collect from power systems since
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Fig. 3. The IEEE PSRC D6 benchmark test system.
are very rare incidents in power systems. This is in line
with assumption in anomaly detection systems in the literature
[27]. Since the autoencoder has not been trained on data con-
taining cyberattacks, we hypothesize that reconstructions of
anomalous measurements occurring during attacks may not be
reconstructed well [27], [28]. Thus, we aim to use a threshold
of the autoencoder reconstruction error as a means of detecting
anomalous measurements that may indicate cyberattacks.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
A. Test System
Fig. 3 illustrates the IEEE power system relaying committee
(PSRC) D6 benchmark test system [29], [30]. The benchmark
test system represents a power plant with four generators G1-
G4 that are connected to the main grid through a 500kV
transmission system. The 500kV transmission system consists
of four transmission lines L1-L4 and the main grid is modeled
as an infinite bus S1. The power plant transformers Tr1-Tr4
are protected by differential protective relays.
B. Training Data Set
We employed OPAL-RT HYPERSIM to implement and
simulate PSRC D6 test system and generate the data set for
machine learning. The operating points of the generators G1-
G4 are changed between 200 MW and 400 MW in 50 MW





















Fig. 4. Proposed Fully Connected Autoencoder Structure
is simulated for 16 randomly selected starting times to ensure
faults occur at different parts of the current waveforms. This
amounts to 10000 simulations. In order to be consistent with
SV packet specifications in IEC 61850 standard, we capture
4800 samples per second for current measurements per phase.
The 10000 simulations are performed for 1.5 seconds and
the transformer faults are initiated randomly between t=1 s
to t=1.02 s. It is noteworthy that the period of one cycle is
approximately 0.0167 s in a 60Hz power system.
An important parameter for generating training data set is
the input data length, i.e., number of samples in each training
data. In this paper, a sliding window of 10-ms, i.e., 48 samples
of current for each phase is considered. Thus, each training
data contains 288 current samples, i.e., 144 three-phase current
samples from each side of the transformer. In order to generate
a 10-ms sliding window, we first extract a 20-ms window from
the 1.5 s simulation results containing 48 samples before the
starting point of the fault and 47 samples after the starting
point of the fault. Next, a sliding window of 10-ms slides
sample by sample till it covers the 20-ms window. This
amounts to 48 10-ms windows per simulation. Considering
10000 simulations, 2000 simulations data are used for testing.
Hence, the training data set contains 48*8000=384000 10-ms
current measurement data.
C. Cyberattack Test Sets
In a real world, the anomaly detection data is heavily
imbalanced and attacks are rare events. As we mentioned,
we have 2000 simulation data sequences for test. To make
an imbalanced data set, for each scenario, we replace 100 of
the sequences with malicious data sequences. As discussed in
Section II. B, we consider two cyberattack scenarios against
transformer differential protective relay. Malicious data se-
quences are generated based on the aforementioned cyberat-
tack scenarios. In Scenario 1, the current measurements from
the current transformer CT1 are scaled to trigger the trans-
former differential protective relay. In Scenario 2, the current
















































































Fig. 5. Reconstruction of phase A current measurements from CT1 and CT2
during transformer physical fault.
D. Metrics for Measuring the Cyberattack Detection Perfor-
mance of Fully Connected Autoencoder
Two metrics including precision and recall are considered to










In (1)-(2), True Positive represents anomalous data that
are correctly identified by fully connected autoencoder. False
Positive represents three-phase transformer fault data that
are incorrectly identified as anomalous data. False Negative
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Fig. 6. Reconstruction of phase A current measurements from CT1 and CT2
after a supply chain cyberattack.
three-phase fault. True Negative represents transformer three-
phase faults that are correctly identified as transformer three-
phase fault.
E. Fully Connected Autoencoder Architecture
As illustrated in Fig. 4 for the input layer, data has
been flattened to a vector size of (window size) ∗
(count of features) = 48 ∗ 6. Hence, we have input layer
of size 288, and output layer with the same size. The code
size has been set to size 16. The autoencoder has two hidden
layers for encoder/decoder. The hidden layers in the encoder
have 64 and 32 neurons respectively, and the hidden layers in
the decoder have 32 and 64 neurons.
We examined different values for each parameter in order
to tune hyper-parameters of the autoencoder as summarized
in Table I. The parameters that produced the lowest validation
errors are selected. It is noteworthy that the validation errors
are not reported here for the sake of conciseness. The Relu
activation function is used for all layers except the last layer
which uses linear activation function. The Adam Optimizer is
further used for optimization. The learning rate is set to 0.01.
It is noteworthy that we used Tensorflow and Keras libraries
for the implementation of the autoencoder.
TABLE I
PARAMETER VALUES EXAMINED FOR HYPER-PARAMETER SELECTION
Parameter Values
Learning rate {0.01, 0.001}
Hidden layers in encoder/decoder {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
Neurons in first hidden layer {32, 64, 128}
Fig. 5 illustrates the capability of the fully connected au-
toencoder to reconstruct phase A current measurements from
CT1 and CT2 during transformer physical fault.
F. Case Studies
The fully connected autoencoder has been tested for the two
cyberattack scenarios defined in Section II.B.
1) Scenario 1: The autoencoder performance is examined
for different changes in current measurement magnitudes. The
scaling of current measurements ranging between 1.1 to 5 are
considered and tested. The fully connected autoencoder was
able to identify the attacks with 100% precision and 100%
recall. It is noteworthy that the autoencoder becomes active
when the pick up element of the differential protective relay
detects a physical fault on the transformer and becomes active.
Thus, the autoencoder is capable of detecting and blocking
the anomalous current measurements. This mitigation strategy
detects and prevents cyberattacks before causing differential
protective relay misoperation and transformer false tripping
but would not be able to identify the source of the cyberattack.
Fig. 6 illustrates an example of phase A current measure-
ments reconstruction for CT1 and CT2 during cyberattacks
on MU1 using a supply chain attack. As it can be seen
from Fig. 6, the autoencoder reconstructs the phase A current
measurements from CT1 and CT2 with high error.
2) Scenario 2: The autoencoder was able to identify the
false data injection attacks with 100% precision and 100% re-
call. A similar mitigation strategy to what has been considered
for Scenario 1 is applied here.
Fig. 7 illustrates an example of phase A current mea-
surements reconstruction for CT1 and CT2 during false data
injection cyberattacks. As it can be seen from Fig. 7, the
autoencoder reconstructs the phase A current measurements
from CT1 and CT2 with high error.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper presented a method for cybersecurity enhance-
ment of transformer differential protective relays using ma-
chine learning. A fully connected autoencoder is trained
using sliding windows of 10-ms composed of the current
measurements at each side of the transformer. The sliding
windows contain 48 SV single-phase current measurements
i.e., 144 SV three-phase current measurements at each side
of the transformer. The data sets used for the autoencoder
training are generated and archived using OPAL-RT HYPER-
SIM for different operating points of the test system under
study. Afterwards, the proposed autoencoder is employed for
detection and mitigation of two different cyberattack scenarios.
The simulation results demonstrate the capability and high
performance of the proposed machine learning algorithm for
detection and mitigation of cyberattacks against transformer
differential protective relays. While these results are very
encouraging, further research should investigate a larger range
of scenarios to better understand the range of conditions where
autoencoders perform well.
REFERENCES
[1] G. N. Ericsson, “Cyber security and power system communication:
Essential parts of a smart grid infrastructure,” IEEE Trans. Power Del.,
vol. 25, no. 3, pp. 1501-1507, Jul. 2010.
[2] S. Ward et al., “Cyber security issues for protective relays; c1 working
group members of power system relaying committee,” In Proc. IEEE
















































































 !    ! 
Fig. 7. Reconstruction of phase A current measurements from CT1 and CT2
after FDI cyberattacks.
[3] North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) Critical Infras-
tructure Protection (CIP) Reliability Standards, http://www.nerc.com
[4] K. Stouffer, J. Falco, and K. Scarfone, “Guide to Industrial Control
Systems (ICS) Security,” NIST SP 800-82, 2015.
[5] E. Smith, S. Corzine, D. Racey, D. Patrick, H. Colin, and J. Weiss, “Going
beyond cybersecurity compliance,” IEEE Power Energy Mag., vol. 14, no.
5, pp. 48-56, Sep. 2016.
[6] ISA99, Industrial Automation and Control Systems Security. Accessed
on Aug. 2016.
[7] Electric Power Research Institute “Creating Security Metrics for the
Electric Sector”, Dec. 2015.
[8] Department of Energy, Roadmap to Achieve Energy Delivery Systems
Cybersecurity, 2011.
[9] Department of Energy, Multiyear Plan for Energy Sector Cybersecurity,
2018.
[10] R. M. Lee, M. J. Assante, and T. Conway, “Analysis of the Cyber Attack
on the Ukrainian Power Grid Defense Use Case”, Electricity-Information
Sharing and Analysis Center (E–ISAC), March 2016.
[11] J. Slowik, Anatomy of an attack: Detecting and Defeating
CRASHOVERRIDE, Dragos Inc. White Paper, Oct. 2018.
[12] T. D. J. Blackburn, Protective Relaying: Principles and Applications, 4th
ed. CRC Press, 2014.
[13] M. Kezunovic, J. Ren, and S. Lotfifard, Design, Modeling and Eval-
uation of Protective Relays for Power Systems, Springer International
Publishing, 2006.
[14] X. Liu, M. Shahidehpour, Z. Li, X. Liu, Y. Cao, and Z. Li, “Power
system risk assessment in cyber attacks considering the role of protection
systems,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 572–580 March 2017.
[15] M. Bahrami, M. Fotuhi-Firuzabad and H. Farzin, “Reliability evaluation
of power grids considering integrity attacks against substation protective
IEDs,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, early access.
[16] A. Abiri-Jahromi, A. Kemmeugne, D. Kundur and A. Haddadi, “Cyber-
physical attacks targeting communication-assisted protection schemes,”
IEEE Trans. Power Syst., early access 2019.
[17] U. K. Premaratne, J. Samarabandu, and T. S. Sidhu, “An intrusion
detection system for IEC61850 automated substations,” IEEE Trans.
Power Del., vol. 25, pp. 2376–2383, Oct. 2010.
[18] J. Hong et al., “Cyber attack resilient distance protection and circuit
breaker control for digital substations,” IEEE Trans. Indust. Inform., vol.
15, no. 7, pp. 4332–4341, July 2019.
[19] A. Ameli, A. Hooshyar, and E. F. El-Saadany, “Development of a cyber-
resilient line current differential relay,” IEEE Trans. Indust. Inform., vol.
15, no. 1, pp. 305–318, Jan. 2019.
[20] C. W. Ten, J. Hong, and C. C. Liu, “Anomaly detection for cybersecurity
of the substations,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 2, no. 4, pp. 865-873,
Dec. 2011.
[21] J. Hong, C. C. Liu, and M. Govindarasu, “Integrated anomaly detection
for cyber security of the substations,” IEEE Trans. Smart Grid, vol. 5,
no. 4, pp. 1643-1653, April 2014.
[22] J. Hong, and C. C. Liu,“Intelligent electronic devices with collaborative
intrusion detection systems” IEEE Trans Smart Grid, vol. 10, no. 1, pp.
271–281, Jan. 2019.
[23] Y. Xin, L. Kong, Z. Liu, Y. Chen, Y. Li, H. Zhu, M. Gao, H. Hou, and C.
Wang, “Machine learning and deep learning methods for cybersecurity,”
IEEE Access, vol. 6, pp. 35365–35381, 2018.
[24] A. Ahmed et al., “Cyber Physical Security Analytics for Anomalies
in Transmission Protection Systems,” IEEE Trans. Indust. App., early
access.
[25] Z. Basnight, J. Butts, Jr. J. Lopez and T. Dube, Firmware modifica-
tion attacks on programmable logic controllers, International Journal of
Critical Infrastructure Protection, vol. 6, pp. 76–84, 2013.
[26] I. Goodfellow, Y. Bengio, and A. Courville. Deep learning. MIT press,
2016.
[27] V. Chandola, A. Banerjee, V. Kumar, “Anomaly detection: A survey,”
ACM computing surveys (CSUR), 41.3, 2009.
[28] M. Sakurada, and T. Yairi, “Anomaly detection using autoencoders with
nonlinear dimensionality reduction,” Proceedings of the MLSDA 2014 2nd
Workshop on Machine Learning for Sensory Data Analysis, ACM, 2014.
[29] IEEE PSRC WG D6, “Power swing and out-of-step considerations on
transmission lines,” Jul. 2005.
[30] H. Gras, J. Mahseredjian, E. Rutovic, U. Karaagac, A. Haddadi, O.
Saad, I. Kocar, and A. El-Akoum, “A new hierarchical approach for
modeling protection systems in EMT–type software,” Intern. Conf. Power
Syst. Transients, Seoul, Republic of Korea, June 2017.
